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HOW ‘UNIVERSAL’ IS THE UNITED NATIONS’ UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW 
PROCESS? AN EXAMINATION OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD ON POLYGAMY  
 
Abstract  
In 2006, United Nations Human Rights Council was tasked to establish a new human 
rights monitoring mechanism: Universal Periodic Review process. The primary aim of 
this process is to promote and protect the universality of all human rights issues and 
concerns via a dialogical peer review process. The primary aim of this investigation is 
to ask the following question: has this claim of promoting and protecting the 
universality of the human rights been met, or challenged, during state reviews in the 
UPR process? The issue of polygamy has been selected as the focus for this 
investigation to be used, primarily, as a tool to undertake an in-depth analysis of the 
discussions held during state reviews in the review process. In addition, this paper will 
employ scholarly debates between universalism and cultural relativism, as well as the 
sophisticated and nuanced approaches that fall in between the polarised opposites, to 
analyse the discussions held on human rights during state reviews. Ultimately, the 
findings and discussion of this investigation will provide a unique and valuable insight 
to the work and operation of the UPR process, so far.  
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Established in 2006, to replace its predecessor the United Nations Commission on 
Human rights, the United Nations Human Rights Council was tasked to undertake 
reviews of states of their human rights obligations through a new human rights 
monitoring mechanism: Universal Periodic Review process. The objective of the review 
is to assess the fulfilment of human rights obligations by each state of the United 
Nations in a manner that ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment via a 
dialogical peer review process. It is this dialogical element of the review process that 
gives it its novel and unique character. Each state is to be peer reviewed once every 
four years. The UPR process has completed its first two cycles of reviews; the first took 
place between 2008 and 2011, and the second between 2012 and 2016. Therefore, to 
date, all states of the United Nations have been reviewed twice under in the UPR 
process. Described by, the then, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to have ‘great 
potential to promote and protect human rights in the darkest corners of the world, 
(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008) the review process has been 
applauded as ‘one of the most important and innovative mechanisms of the Council’ 
(KP Sharma Oli, ‘Statement Honourable KP Sharma, 2006). One of the primary reasons 
for such optimism is largely based on a significant trait of the UPR process: its universal 
nature. This claim of ‘universality’ in the work and operation of the UPR process is 
embedded on two fundamental grounds that form the primary aim of the review. The 
first aspect of the claim is based on the universal coverage and applicability of the 
process. It is the first human rights monitoring mechanism whereby all member states 
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of the United Nations are held accountable for their international human rights law 
obligations under the same uniform procedure (A/RES/60/251). The completion of two 
cycles of review with full participation by every member state shows that, to date, this 
aspect of the claim has been achieved.  
 
The second aspect of the universal claim of the UPR process is more challenging to 
achieve in nature, and forms the focus of investigation for this paper. In its founding 
resolution, it was stated that the primary aim of the process is to ‘promote the 
universality, interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights’ 
(A/HRC/RES/5/1, para 3(a)). This aim is recognised in practice by peer states assessing 
the extent to which a state under review is in compliance with its international human 
rights obligations, and issuing recommendations to reform domestic practice in areas 
of concern. The primary aim of this paper is to ask the following question: to what 
extent has this claim of universality of the human rights been met, or challenged, during 
state reviews in the UPR process?  
 
It is important to contextualise this claim of universality, in the work and operation of 
the UPR process, within the scholarly literature on universalism and relativism in 
conceptualising and implementing international human rights norms. As Meyer aptly 
notes, there are ‘few scholarly debates more readily engender controversies than the 
question of the universality of human rights norms’ (Meyer 1992). The most significant 
critique of the claims of universality of human rights norms is the theory of cultural 
relativism. For the present purposes, and at the risk of oversimplification, cultural 
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relativism challenges the universal claim of human rights by arguing that moral value 
judgments, such as interpretation and implementation of human rights, are relative to 
different cultural contexts from which such moral judgements arise (Hatch 1993; 
Joyner and Dettling 1990; Binder 1999). The universalist and relativist debates on 
human rights is now the focus of a substantial and sophisticated line of scholarly works. 
These works will be employed to help understand and analyse the nature of dialogue 
held in the UPR process, with the ultimate aim to answer the research question of this 
investigation. 
 
To date, over 55 different human rights issues have been raised in the UPR process, 
with multiple sub issues raised within these categories. This means that there is a 
separate line of discussions held amongst states on each of these human rights issues. 
To undertake an analysis of all these lines of discussions would be implausible, and 
unfruitful, for the purposes of this investigation. One of the most contentious issues 
raised in both cycles of review was the issue of women’s rights in the context of 
polygamous marriages. Not being restricted to the African and Asian regions, the issue 
of polygamy has consistently and prominently been a focus in the international news 
(Amnesty International, Iran 2011; BBC News 2012; The Independent New York times 
2016, 2017). Whilst it is condemned under international human rights law, such 
marriages continue to be practiced, and are often justified on, broadly defined: cultural 
grounds. In light of this discrepancy between some domestic laws and the international 
human rights position on the issue, particularly due the increased susceptibility of 
cultural justifications for the practice; the issue of polygamy will be utilised as a focus 
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for this investigation to assess whether any disagreements on the issue is vocalised 
during the discussions in the review process.  
 
The findings of this investigation will provide a unique and valuable insight to the work 
and operation of the UPR process. Moving away from the solely technocratic, 
constitutional, or state focused analysis of the review process in the existing literature 
(Dominguez-Redondo 2012; Jonas 2012; Abebe 2009; de Frouville 2011; McMahon and 
Ascherio 2012; Cochrane and McNeilly 2013; Sweeney and Saito 2009; de la Vega and 
Lewis 2011; Sen 2011; Sarkin 2010; Komanovics and Mazur-Kumrić  2012), this 
investigation has considered the UPR process as a phenomenon of exploration in itself. 
This investigation will undertake a sustained and comprehensive analysis of the 
dialogues held on the issue of polygamy over the two cycles of review to provide an 
evaluative contribution to help understand the nature of the review process, and how 
this unique monitoring mechanism operates in practice.  
 
This paper is organised into five main sections. The focus of the first section is to 
provide a brief overview of the mechanics and modalities of the UPR process. The 
second section will provide a succinct account of the contemporary debates between 
universalism and relativism. This theoretical analysis will be employed to interpret, 
understand and analyse the discussions held on women’s rights in the context of 
polygamy. The third section will analyse why the issue of polygamy is a human rights 
issue, despite the lack of a specific human rights norm prohibiting such marriages. In 
the fourth section, the findings of the investigation are presented, and the fifth section 
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is dedicated to providing a discussion on these findings with the aim of answering the 
research question posed for this investigation.  
1.2. The Mechanics and Modalities of the UPR process 
 
The UPR process is a peer review mechanism, whereby the human rights records of all 
193 member states are reviewed once every 4 years (A/RES/60/251 para, 5). The 
review considers the state’s performance in relation to its obligations under the United 
Nations’ Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; United Nations human 
rights treaties to which the state is a party; any voluntary pledges it has made regarding 
human rights, including any commitments it had made during the previous cycle of 
review; and the principles of international humanitarian law. ((A/HRC/RES/5/1, para 
3(i)). The first cycle of the UPR was held between 2008 - 2011, allowing 48 states to be 
reviewed per year. The second cycle of review was held in 2012 until the end of 2016, 
permitting the review of 42 states per year.  
 
The review is based on a compilation of three written reports: a ‘national report’, which 
is a self-assessment of the human rights situation in the domestic context 
(A/HRC/RES/5/1, Annex 1 section 15 (a)). The other two reports provide an external 
account of the state’s human rights obligations: one report is a collection of 
information provided by a number of United Nations bodies; the other report is based 
on information provided by stakeholders, such as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), or other national human rights institutions (NHRIs) (A/HRC/RES/5/1, Annex 1 
section 15 b and c). Once these reports have been circulated, state representatives are 
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invited to consult these reports and to devise questions and recommendations to be 
directed to the state under review at, what is, the key stage of the review process: the 
interactive dialogue session. Formally, each state review is undertaken by the UPR 
Working Group, which consists of the 47 member states of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council. However, at the interactive dialogue stage, any member state of the 
United Nations can take the stage to make a comment, ask a question or provide a 
recommendation to the state under review in relation to any human rights issue. In 
response, the state under review is required to provide an instantaneous reply 
(A/HRC/PRST/8/1, para 4). This dialogue can last up to 3 and a half hours. Following the 
discussions, a Final Outcome Report is produced, which consists of all the comments, 
questions, recommendations and responses provided by states. (A/HRC/RES/5/1, 
Annex 1, section 27). The recommendations that enjoy the support of the state under 
review are identified as being ‘accepted’, and those recommendations that are not 
accepted will be ‘noted’ (A/HRC/RES/5/1, para 32). As such, formally, no 
recommendations are recorded as being ‘rejected’ by the state under review in the 
UPR process. However, often the statements made by the states under review, which 
accompany the responses, provide a strong indication when a recommendation is 
rejected.  
 
The interactive dialogue session plays a fundamental and unique role in determining 
the extent to which the UPR process meets its ultimate aim to further the promotion 
protection of human rights. This is because the state under review is required to 
formally express its position in response to the recommendations issued, which if 
accepted, generates an expression of commitment to the action being suggested on 
any given human rights issue. This commitment can not only be used to review the 
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state’s progress in the next cycle of review, but can also be used as a tool by civil society 
and stakeholders to hold states accountable in the domestic context. In addition, the 
political momentum that is generated amongst the discussions held on particular issues 
on the interactive dialogue session can create avenues to influence or facilitate 
domestic policy and social reforms in the state under review. In this way, for the 
purposes of this investigation, it is suggested that the nature of the discussions held in 
the interactive dialogue session can set the tone of any domestic social and policy 
reforms on the issue of polygamy.  
 
Once the review is complete, the state under review has the primary responsibility to 
implement the recommendations prior to its next cycle of review. The implementation 
process may be undertaken with the aid of other UN systems, civil society, national 
human rights institutions, and other relevant stakeholders.  
 
1.3. Mediating between the debate on Universalism and Cultural 
Relativism  
The renowned optimism that engulfed the UPR process is primarily based on its 
universal nature. With all the member states of United Nations having completed their 
reviews in the two cycles of the process, the aim of universal applicability, to date, been 
fulfilled.   
 
The other, more challenging, aspect of the universal claim of the UPR process is 
embedded in its founding resolution, where it is stated that one of the primary aims of 
the process is to promote and protect the universality of all human rights 
(A/HRC/RES/5/1, para 3(a)). This universal claim in relation to human rights at the 
United Nations is not novel, as it is has been proclaimed, reaffirmed and emphasised in 
a profound number of international human rights documents. Indeed, the notion of 
universality is often intertwined with the conceptualisation of human rights. For 
example, Maurice Cranston conceives human rights to mean ‘by definition universal 
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moral rights, something which all men, everywhere, at all times ought to have’ 
(Cranston 1995).  Going further, Richard Wasserston’s widely cited definition conceives 
the notions of universality and human rights synonymously, as he suggests that any 
right, to qualify as a human right, is contingent on the requirement of it being universal 
(Wasserston 1964). Elaborating on these definitions, Jack Donnelly succinctly argues 
that as humanity or human nature is universal, logically, human rights should also be 
universal, and as such, since being a human cannot be relinquished in any way, human 
rights are not only egalitarian in their entitlement, but are also inalienable (Donnelly 
1998). In this regard, the contemporary definition of human rights draws its claim of 
universality from the multiple strands of moral universalism, which holds core the value 
that there exists a reasoned and identifiable moral order, which precedes any social, 
historic and moral contingency(Donnelly 1989). In other words, universalists’ claim that 
the implementation of international human rights norm should transcend any cultural 
boundaries and particularities (Sloane 2001). 
 
Despite the attractive simplicity of the universal proclamation of rights, both in the 
documents produced at the United Nations and in the scholarly writings, it veils the 
multifaceted issues and concerns that are embedded in the interpretation and 
implementation of international human rights norms. Indeed, the proclaimed 
universality of human rights has been most prominently contested following the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where the American 
Anthropological Association issued a widely circulated statement rejecting the 
possibility of the universal implementation of international human rights norms 
(Executive Board, American Anthropological Association 1947). This statement is 
rooted in the most profound challenges to the universality of human rights: the theory 
of cultural relativism. Similar to the many strands of moral universalism, cultural 
relativism has numerous variations. At the heart of this theory are two core values. 
First, that, all values and moral belief systems are culturally specific (Meyer 1996); 
consequently, ‘what is morally right in relation to one moral framework can be morally 
wrong in relation to a different moral framework’ (Harman and Thomson 1964). 
Second, it is believed that as there are such wide variations between the belief systems 
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within cultures, norms are incomprehensible to one another with no possibility of 
constructive dialogue between them (Spaak 2007; Kuhn 1979). Cultural relativists 
thereby challenge the universalist claim of human rights by arguing that moral value 
judgments, such as interpretations of what constitutes human rights, are relative to 
different cultural contexts from which such moral judgments arise. (Hatch 1983; Joyner 
and Dettling 1990; Binder 1999; Teson 1984).  
The polarisation of the human rights discourse between universalism and cultural 
relativism is a relatively distant past within scholarly debates. Contemporary scholarly 
discourse on universalism and relativism has shifted away from these two extremes 
toward a broad consensus in accepting the merits of the universal project on 
international human rights law; whilst recognising the importance of culture in 
supporting its conceptualisation and implementation in the domestic contexts. 
(Dembour 2001; Renteln 1985, 2013; An-Na’im 1991; Lenzerini 2014; Merry 2003; 
Zwart 2012; Obermeyer 1995; Falk 1995). Space here does not permit an in depth 
analysis of all the approaches suggested by scholars in mediating between universalism 
and relativism. Instead, an analysis of the interpretation of culture, and the concept of 
cultural legitimacy will provide a succinct, yet invaluable, insight of the nuanced and 
sophisticated discussions held in between the polarised extremes of universalism and 
relativism.  
1.3.1 Conceptualising ‘culture’ and ‘cultural legitimacy’  
Numerous scholarly works have been dedicated to the conceptualisation and 
significance of culture (Geertz Pearce and Kang 1988; An-Naim and J Hammond, 2000; 
Fisher 1988; Lindolhm 1985; Nyamu-Musembi, 2002; Herskovitz 1964). Whilst these 
discussions are fundamental, a more detailed analysis of the boundaries of culture can 
provide a tool to understanding the more nuanced positions held by scholars in 
between the spectrum of universalism and relativism.  
 
The Boasian interpretation of culture is the most criticised as it perceives culture as a 
‘static, homogenous and bounded entity’ (Pries 1996; Boas 2012). In this regard, 
culture is understood to be ‘time insensitive’ and consequently determines ‘the destiny 
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of the population and the ways in which they think, feel, judge and behave’ (Li 2006; 
Bell 2001). One of the most profound criticism of this narrow interpretation of culture 
is that it not only plays pretence to the possibility of boundaries being drawn around 
any human group, but, more importantly, it fails to take into account historical and 
social changes that occur within cultures over a period of time (Pries 1996; Perry 1998: 
Donnelly 1984). This reluctance to accept that cultural norms can be reformed is at the 
heart of the strongest form of cultural relativism. At the centre of this critique, there is 
a belief that cultural values should be the sole legitimating factor in assessing external 
norms. This form of relsativism belief holds the false presumption that cultural beliefs 
can be determined by clear boundaries. In addition, the prioritisation of cultural values 
over external norms presumes that cultural beliefs are not subject to any reforms. This 
form of relativism is often used by repressive regimes to justify intolerable practices 
(Iovane 2007, 231; Donoho 1991, 380), and it is these views which are responsible for 
the ‘scorn of cultural relativism by philosophers (A Renteln 1990). 
In contrast, a modern conceptualisation of culture recognises it as a dynamic process 
by with ‘fluid’ boundaries.  (Lindholm 1985; Nyambu-Musembi 2002; Ibhawoh, 2000). 
Scholars that adopt this interpretation recognise that cultures are often subject to 
‘internal inconsistencies, conflicts and contradictions’ (Merry, 2003). Sally Engle Merry 
clarifies the traditional misconception in the interpretation of culture by arguing that 
contemporary anthropologists understand cultural ‘boundaries as fluid’ as cultural 
norms are ‘marked by hybridity and creolization rather than uniformity or consistency’ 
(Merry, 2003). In this regard, cultural norms and values are considered to be both open, 
and subject, to changes and reforms (Ibhawoh, 2000, 841). In fact, An’Naim has 
suggested that the permeable nature of cultural norms can be utilised to support and 
ultimately enhance the implementation of human rights protection (An’Naim 1995).  
 
The essence of this conceptualisation of culture is encapsulated in the works of a 
number of scholars that have identified the merits of cultural support in furthering the 
implementation of international human rights in the local context. (An-Naim 1995; 
Zwart 2012; Merry 2006; Falk 1995; Lenzerini 2014). Whilst there are nuanced 
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variations between the suggestions advocated by scholars, their positions have formed 
part of the contemporary discourse in mediating between relativism and universalism. 
For instance, Marie-Benedicte Dembour recognises that considering the positions of 
universalism and relativism in isolation of each other is untenable (Dembour 2001). 
Instead, she argues that we should ‘err uncomfortably between the two poles 
represented by universalism and relativism’ (Dembour 2001). Expanding on her 
position, she suggests that there should be a strive toward an intermediatory position, 
whereby the dialogue and implementation of international human rights law should 
‘allow local circumstances to be taken into account, to be part of the equation’ 
(Dembour 2001). Similarly, Alison Dundes Renteln attempts to offer a solution between 
the polarised debates by suggesting that, despite differences amongst individuals, 
there exists cross cultural universal values that are held in common by all societies, 
which can be used to legitimise universal moral standards (Renteln 1990).  
 
At the heart of the suggestions posited by scholars that mediate between universalism 
and relativism is the ultimate goal of achieving cultural legitimacy of human rights. 
Cultural legitimacy is the belief that international human rights norms are more likely 
to achieve authority and reverence by members of a particular culture, if they are 
considered to be validated by the culture norms and principles, and also bring benefits 
to the members of the culture (An’Naim, 1990). Amongst the scholars that have 
provided contributions in seeking an intermediatory position between the polarised 
debate, the contribution by Abdullahi An-Na’im forms the most prolific and 
comprehensive. At the centre of his scholarly works, which spans over many decades, 
is the aim to achieve cultural legitimacy of international human rights norms. He argues 
that as human beings comprehend things through their own cultural lens, the 
legitimacy of human rights norms can only be achieved if members of a particular 
culture consider the norms to be validated and sanctioned by their own cultural norms 
(An-Na’im 1990). To this end, An-Na’im has developed a two stage approach in 
implementing the cross cultural approach to the interpretation and implementation of 
human rights. The first is to engage in an ‘internal discourse’ within cultures on those 
values and beliefs that are inconsistent with international human rights law. With the 
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aim to avoid ‘dictation by outsiders’, individual actors within the culture itself are 
encouraged to undertake reforms based on cultural principles, norms and texts 
(An’Naim 1994). Once an adequate level of legitimacy is assumed through an internal 
discourse, An’Naim suggests that the next stage is to engage in a cross cultural 
dialogue. This involves the participation by people of diverse cultures in agreeing upon 
the meaning, scope and implementation of human rights at international and local level 
(An-Naim 1995). Part of the role of the external actors is to support and encourage 
those within the culture to legitimatise human rights norms by implementing 
appropriate internal cultural dialogue and policy implementation. Such a cross cultural 
dialogue is to be undertaken between different member’s states on an international 
forum.  
 
The above analysis demonstrates how the contemporary discussions on international 
human rights norms have moved away from the polarised extremes of universalism 
and relativism. Instead, those scholars that are engaged in these debates have 
suggested more nuanced positions that recognise the merits of universal project of 
human rights, as well as the significance of culture in the conceptualising and successful 
implementation of human rights. This theoretical discussion can be employed to 
understand and analyse dialogues on any human rights issue, which may be contrary 
to international human rights law, yet has support in the domestic context based on 
cultural values and norms. One example of such issue, that forms the focus of this 
investigation, is that of polygamy. Raised in both the first and second cycle of the UPR 
process, the issue of polygamy has often had a strong association with culture with 
some claiming that the practice is condoned by cultural norms and values. Before the 
findings are presented, it is worth mapping polygamous marriages in the context of 
women rights and international human rights law, more broadly. 
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1.4. International Human Rights law and the Problems posed for 
Women’s Rights in Polygamous Marriages 
To begin with, it is important to note that there are no human rights norms within the 
international human rights framework that expressly prohibit polygamy. Nevertheless, 
the United Nations jurisprudence, emanating from the treaty bodies, have made it clear 
that polygamous marriages violate a wide range of civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights of women, which are embedded in an array of international human rights 
documents, and other customary documents (CCPR General Comment No.28, 2000 
para 24; CEDAW General Recommendation 21 1994 para 14). The most profound claim 
is that such marriages are contrary to the protection of the right to non-discrimination 
and equality before the law. This is because polygamous marriages permit a man to 
take an additional spouse, but do not grant a similar right to a woman to take a 
husband; on this basis it is has been stated that such marriages should be prohibited. 
(ICCPR Article 23(4) 1966; CCPR General Comment No.28, 2000 para 24; UDHR 1948). 
Moreover, the Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) has made it clear that as polygamous marriages are 
incompatible with a number of women’s rights they should be prohibited: regardless 
of whether such marriages are deeply rooted in cultural and traditional values. (UN 
Press Release WOM/1452 2004; CEDAW General Recommendation 21 1994 para 41). 
 
Despite repeated assertions on the prohibition of such marriages in the jurisprudence 
of the United Nations, the regulation of polygamous marriages under domestic 
jurisdiction is subject to wide ranging variations. At one end of the spectrum, some 
states, largely in the European and American regions, prohibit polygamous marriages 
under law, and, in some instances, the practice of such marriages is declared as a 
criminal offence (Gaffney-Rhys (2011). In contrast, in other states, largely located in the 
African and Asian regions, polygamous marriages are recognized under the domestic 
legal system and are practiced, often, with some conditions and restrictions (Gaffney-
Rhys 2011; WLUML 2006). In few parts of the world, for instance in central Africa, the 
legal status of a polygamous marriage is ambiguous, as both civil law and customary 
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law and/or religious law operate simultaneously (De Cruz 2010). In such cases, the 
multiple legal systems means that polygamous marriages may not be lawful under civil 
law, but continue to be practiced as they are often recognized under 
customary/religious law.  
 
The discrepancy that exists between the United Nations’ stance on polygamous 
marriages, and the continued practice of such marriages in some local context, is often 
related to cultural and religious norms. For instance, those that are sympathetic to such 
marriages often cite religious norms as mandating polygamy (Rehman 2007). 
Frequently, coinciding with this justification, the support of such marriages is claimed 
to have emanated from values embedded in culture. For instance, such marriage 
institutions facilitate socio-political alliances, as well as being the source of prestige, 
power and influence (Nkomazana 2006). Offering a possible explanation for such 
cultural justifications in relation to polygamous marriages, scholars have drawn upon 
the division between ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres that exist in the mainstream 
women’s rights discourse (Charlesworth 1995). The public sphere is considered to 
include government and political activities, which are largely regulated by the state; 
whereas the private sphere is the family and domestic life, which predominately raises 
issues that impact women and are more likely to be susceptible to regulation by cultural 
norms (Peach 2001; Hernandez-Truyol 1999). In this way, as polygamy falls within the 
remit of the private sphere, the rights, issues and concerns of women are more fragile 
to the claims of culture (Cerna 1994; Cerna and Wallace 1999; Mertus 1995; 
Hernandez- Truyol 1999). This increased susceptibility of women’s rights in relation to 
polygamy being subject to the claims of culture makes it a suitable for to question the 
overarching claim of universality of the UPR process. The spread of human rights 
standard and obligations in relation to women’s rights in relation to polygamy across a 
number of human rights instruments makes the UPR process a unique mechanism with 
a potential to undertake a comprehensive review and hold states to account of these 
rights that are engaged in polygamous marriages in a single exercise.  
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1.5. Findings on how the issue of Polygamy was discussed during state 
reviews 
Over the two cycles of the UPR process, the issue of polygamy was raised at the 
interactive dialogue session during 18 state reviews. The discussions on polygamy were 
predominately held in the first cycle, as the issue was only raised during the review of 
5 states in the second cycle of the UPR process. A total of 22 recommendations have 
been issued on polygamy over the two cycles. Of these, only 10 recommendations were 
accepted, and 12 being noted by the states under review; this reflects the lack of 
consensus on the issue.  
 
In terms of geographical locations of the states that received recommendations on 
polygamy, 14 of 18 states were from the African region. In addition, it has emerged 
that whilst African states were, overwhelming, on the receiving end of these 
recommendations; no state from within this region issued a recommendation on 
polygamy. Whilst there may be bureaucratic explanations as to why African states 
refrained from issuing recommendations on polygamy, the consistency of the silence 
over two cycles gives reason to suggest that the lack of participation by African states 
on discussions held on polygamy may be more of a conscious decision, which is 
underpinned by regional alliances.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, the statements issued by states during the interactive 
dialogue sessions have been divided into a number of categories. Organising the 
discussions in this way will help to analyse and formulate a rich understanding of the 
nature conversations held between delegates on polygamy over the two cycles of 
review. Such categorisation will also help to identify any patterns that may emerge in 
the discussions held on the issue, which ultimately will provide a better understanding 
of what the UPR process is, and how it operates in practice.  
 
A summary of the discussions held on polygamy over the two cycles of review is 
encapsulated in Figure 1, below. The statements made during the interactive dialogue 
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sessions can be divided in two main categories: first, recommendations issued by the 
observer states, and second the responses provided by the states under review when 
accepting or noting the recommendation. In the case of both recommendations and 
responses, the title given to each category summarises the essence of the statement 
issued. The recommendations made on polygamy are divided into 4 main categories, 
which can be found on the rows toward the left of Figure 1. The nature of the responses 
provided by the state under review is divided into 6 categories, these can be found on 
the columns in Figure 1, shaded in grey and blue. These 6 categories are further divided 
into 2 main categories; those recommendations that were accepted have been 
abbreviated with an A, and those noted with an N. These found in the columns labelled 
A1 to N4 in Figure 1.  Surprisingly, the nature of recommendations and responses that 
were issued in the second cycle were similar to the first cycle, therefore, the same 





Figure 1. Nature of the dialogue held amongst states on the issue of polygamy in the first and second cycle of the UPR process 
 
 
Universal Periodic Review Cycle 1 
Responses by states under review 
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of any practices harmful 
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(Polygamy declared as a harmful 
traditional practice) 
Madagascar  Turkey Equatorial Guinea  Botswana    
Recommendation 2 
(Reforms to domestic legislation 
on polygamy)  
Kyrgyzstan    Central African Republic  Burkina Faso  
Tanzania  
Recommendation 3 
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Universal Periodic Review Cycle 2 
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Recommendation 2 
(Reforms to domestic legislation 
on polygamy) 
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Recommendation 3 
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  Morocco     
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(Adopt measures to eliminate 
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Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Russia  
    Burkina Faso  
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1.5.1. Recommendation 1: Polygamy declared as a harmful traditional practice  
In the first cycle of review, observer states that issued recommendations under the first 
category expressly declared polygamous marriages to be a harmful traditional practice that 
was required to be eliminated. Encapsulating the essence of this recommendation, during the 
review of Equatorial Guinea, the Norwegian delegate recommended to “combat harmful 
traditional practices under customary law, such as … polygamy” (UNHRC ‘Equatorial Guinea’ 
2010 A/HRC/13/16, para 67.4).  
 
When issued with recommendations of this nature, states under review provided a variety of 
responses. The delegate from Equatorial Guinea noted the recommendation, whilst 
Madagascar accepted; in both instances, neither state provided any statements to provide an 
explanation for the positions that they had adopted. On the other hand, Turkey accepted the 
recommendation, and insisted that ‘polygamy and mere religious marriages…were prohibited’ 
(UNHRC ‘Turkey’ 2010 A/HRC/15/13, para 40).   
 
Adopting a different position, the delegate of Botswana noted the recommendations as it 
denied the ‘existence of harmful practices to women, especially those alleging the…existence 
of polygamy’ (UNHRC ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on its tenth session’ 2009 
A/HRC/10/29, para 272). This response indicates not only that it viewed polygamous marriages 
as harmful to women, but also denied the existence of such marriages in the state. This is 
surprising as Botswanaian law operates under a dual system, whereby customary laws are 
applied alongside common law. Thus, whilst a person may only have one registered spouse 
under common law, a man can take more than one wife under customary law (UN Human 
Rights Council, Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human (2008) 
A/HRC/WG.6/3/BWA/3). This shows that whilst the denial of existence of polygamous 
marriages by the Bostswanian delegate may be correct according to the common law of the 
land, this overlooks the de facto existence of such marriages under customary law.  
 
Overall, it can be observed that when recommendations under this category were issued under 
the first cycle of review, the responses by the states under review were, to a large extent, 
subdued. For instance, regardless of whether the recommendation was formally accepted or 
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noted, the delegates either provided no further comment, or focused on providing details on 
the domestic actions already in place to address polygamy. In this way, states under review 
when held accountable on the issue, fell substantially short of engaging in a fruitful dialogue 
on polygamy. More importantly, when issued with a recommendation under this category, 
states under review did not exercise any commitments to reforming their current practices to 
address the issue of polygamy in their respective states. This lack of commitment exercised by 
any state under review calls in to question the central aim of the UPR process to promote and 
protect universal rights.  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that whilst recommendations under this category were frequently 
issued under the first cycle, in contrast, during the second cycle of review, no observer states 
issued recommendations that described polygamy as a harmful traditional practice.  
 
1.5.2. Recommendation 2:  Reforms to domestic legislation on Polygamy  
The second category of recommendations issued by observer states directed the states under 
review to enact or amend domestic legislative provisions in relation to polygamy. A total of 4 
states were issued with this type of recommendation under the first cycle, and one state in the 
second cycle. Argentina’s recommendation to Kyrgyzstan captures the essence of these 
recommendations when the delegate suggested to ‘enact laws criminalizing…polygamy’ 
(UNHRC ‘Kyrgyzstan’ 2010 A/HRC/15/2, para 76.61).  
 
In the first cycle of review, the delegate of Kyrgyzstan was the only state that accepted a 
recommendation of this nature; however, the delegate refrained from providing any other 
statements. On the other hand, the delegate of The Central African Republic (CAR) noted the 
recommendation explaining that the current ‘family code was being reviewed to ensure its 
compliance with international standards with a view to either maintaining or abolishing 
polygamy’ (UNHRC ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on its twelfth session’ 2010 
A/HRC/12/50, para 221). The refusal to formally accept the recommendation, together with 
the statement that indicates that the CAR is open to the possibility of polygamous marriages 
being maintained under domestic law. This gives reason to suggest that the CAR may adopt a 
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position under domestic law, which may be contrary to its international human rights position 
in relation to polygamous marriages.  
 
The responses to these recommendations provided by Burkina Faso and Tanzania were bold 
and distinctive in nature. This is because the states justified the continuance of polygamous 
marriages on the basis that they were condoned by cultural or religious norms of the state 
under review. Having noted the recommendation, the delegate of Burkina Faso began by 
explaining that ‘polygamous marriage was optional whereas monogamy was the rule.’ (UNHRC 
‘Report of the Human Rights Council on its tenth session’ 2009 A/HRC/10/29, para 577). Going 
further the delegate explained that polygamy was ‘one of the secular aspects of the culture of 
Burkina Faso.’ Similarly, during the review of Tanzania, the delegate explained that the 
recommendation was not accepted ‘on the basis of the enjoyment of cultural and religious 
rights.’ (UNHRC ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on its nineteenth session’ (24 May 2013) 
A/HRC/19/2, paragraph 376).  
 
In the second cycle of review, a recommendation under this category was only issued once, 
which was accepted by Equatorial Guinea; the delegate noted that existing laws to prohibit 
polygamy were already in place. (UNHRC Addendum report of EG). 
 
1.5.3 Recommendation 3: Ensure domestic laws are in compliance with 
international human rights law on polygamy  
 
The focus of the recommendations issued under this category was to ensure that the domestic 
legislation of the state under review was in compliance with international human rights law in 
relation to polygamy.  A total of 3 states were issued with recommendations of this nature in 
the first cycle, and to one state in the second cycle of review. One example of a 
recommendation under this category is Slovenia’s suggestion to Ghana ‘to effectively 
implement measures aimed at eliminating polygamy and bring the norms in line with the 
CEDAW in the shortest time possible’ (UNHRC ‘Ghana’ (29 May 2008) A/HRC/8/36, para 50).  
 
During the first cycle, Israel was the only state that accepted the recommendation explaining 
that it ‘agreed to adopt the recommendation…on polygamy, and had recently reinstructed the 
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Qaddi’s of the sharia courts to refer every suspected case of polygamy to the police.’ (UNHRC 
‘Report of the Human Rights Council on its tenth session’ (9 November 2009) A/HRC/10/29, 
para 460). In contrast, Ghana and Libya both responded by noting the recommendations and 
issuing explanations that were similar in nature. The delegate of Ghana explained marriages 
that were customary or faith-based ‘were in conformity with the customs and traditions of 
Ghana’. (UNHRC ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on its eighth session’ 2008 A/HRC/8/52, 
para 663). Similarly,  the Libyan delegate noted the recommendation under this category 
explaining that the suggested reforms were ‘in conflict with the Islamic religion and the 
customs, cultural specificities and principles of the Libyan people.’ (UNHRC ‘Report of the 
Human Rights Council on its nineteenth session’ 2013 A/HRC/19/2, para 38). It can be observed 
that in both instances, the delegates of Ghana and Libya justified not accepting reforms to 
domestic law to comply with international norms on polygamy by drawing upon customs, 
traditions and cultural particularities of the states. The two state delegates were not reluctant 
to expressly prioritise the cultural and traditional particularities of the state above compliance 
with international human rights norms in relation to polygamy on an international forum such 
at the UPR. 
 
In the second cycle, only Morocco was issued with a recommendation of this nature; the 
delegate noted the recommendations and provided no further explanations.  
 
1.5.4 Recommendation 4: Adopt measures to eliminate polygamy  
This category of recommendation issued on polygamy can be described as being more generic 
in nature. Here, observer states suggested that the state under review should adopt measures 
to eliminate polygamy, without any references to the states’ domestic legislation, or its 
international human rights obligations. A typical example is during the review of Kyrgyzstan 
when Lithuania and Uruguay (issued a recommendation to ‘take additional actions to 
eliminate…polygamy’ (UNHRC ‘Kyrgyzstan’ 2010 A/HRC/15/2, para 76.62). There were a total 
of three states that were issued with recommendations under this category in first cycle. In the 
second cycle, this type of recommendation was the most frequently issued; with a total of 3 
states being issued with it.  
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In response to recommendations issued under this fourth category in the first cycle, two states 
under review accepted the recommendations, whilst one state noted it. The delegates of 
Kyrgyzstan and Mauritania accepted the recommendations and provided not further 
statements. (UNHRC ‘Mauritania’ (4 2011 A/HRC/16/17, para 92). By comparison, the delegate 
of Senegal noted the recommendation and insisted that the observer states ‘should take into 
account the particularities of the Muslim religion which explains the existence of polygamy.’ 
(UNHRC ‘Senegal’ 2009 A/HRC/11/24, para 54). In other words, the delegate of Senegal voiced 
a direct challenge to the suggested reforms on polygamy based on religious particularities of 
the states, which justified the existence of polygamous marriages.  
 
In the second cycle, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Russia accepted the 
recommendations with any further comments. In contrast, Burkina Faso, noted the 
recommendation and explained that ‘those recommendations which were not accepted did 
not adapt easily to the present cultural and socio-economic realities of Burkina Faso’ (para 323: 
HRC Plenary report).  
 
Two points can be noted here. First, the response by Burkina Faso was the only instance in the 
second cycle where a state used cultural justification to decline to accept a recommendation 
on polygamy. Second, Burkina Faso issued the same response as it did in the first cycle of 
review in relation to polygamy. This shows that despite the issue of polygamy being raised 
again, albeit in a different form of recommendation, the state of Burkina Faso provided cultural 
justifications for noting the recommendation.  
 
1.6. Discussion on the Findings of Polygamy in the First and Second Cycle 
of the Review Process 
1.6.1. Generic Overview  
Before undertaking an in-depth analysis on the nature of discussions held on polygamy, a few 
generic points can be noted from reviewing two complete UPR cycles on the issue.  First, from 
observing Figure 1 on the nature of discussions held in both cycles on polygamy, it becomes 
apparent that the issuance of a particular type of recommendations will not generate a 
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particular form of response by the state under review. For example, a category 1 
recommendation will not necessarily result in a category N1 response. This indicates that 
regardless of the recommendations issued on the issue of polygamy in the two cycles, the 
states under review adhere to their selected position on polygamous marriages. In this way, 
the instantaneous responses, which have been lauded as the unique and innovative nature of 
the monitoring process, are not necessarily organic in nature. In the case of polygamy, the 
responses have proven to be a predetermined and a prescribed response to any 
recommendation on the issue.   
 
Second, there is a discrepancy in states being held accountable on the recommendations that 
were noted in the first cycle. For instance, the states of Tanzania, Libya, Ghana and Senegal 
provided unwavering reasons for declining to accept the recommendations on polygamy in the 
first cycle. None of these states were held accountable for their strong positions on the issue 
in the second cycle. Some of this blame can be laid in the establishing resolutions of the UPR 
process, which, unfortunately, provide that the aim of the second cycle is to focus on the 
implementation of accepted recommendations ((A/HRC/DEC/17/119, para 6 and Part II), and 
provide no guidance for action on those recommendations that are noted. For instance, not 
only was Burkina Faso the only state that was held accountable on the issue of polygamy in 
second cycle as well as the first, the delegate provided the same N4 response in the second 
cycle. For this reason, it is suggested that it is likely that the noted recommendations should 
be the issue of further concern, and areas in which further discussions should take place in the 
UPR process. This lack of accountability of states that held a strong position on declined 
recommendations on polygamy is a cause for concern, as it calls into question the fundamental 
purpose of the UPR process to improve and address all human rights situations on the ground 
(A/HRC/RES/5/1, para 4(a)). If states’ positions to reject reforms on polygamy remains 
unchallenged during its review in the UPR process, at best it is difficult to gauge out whether 
any reforms will be implemented on the issue in the local context; or, at worst, the states’ 
unchallenged position at the UPR process may be used as ammunition to reaffirm the states’ 
position to decline to undertaken reforms on the issue in the other international forums, as 




Finally, there has been a rapid decline in the prominence of the issue of polygamy being raised 
during reviews in the second cycle. In addition, the few selected discussions on polygamy 
centred on laws to be reformed on the area, or were simply general observations made on the 
issue. In this regard, there is a clear shift from the nature of discussions that were predominate 
in the first cycle that focused on the relationship between polygamy and culture. It is the focus 
of these discussions that require a more detailed analysis in the next section.  
1.6.2. Nature of Discussions held on Polygamy  
One of the most prevailing findings on the discussions held on polygamy in the first cycle was 
that some states, either in their capacity as observer states or states under review, expressly 
recognised the association between polygamous marriages and cultural norms in one of two 
ways.  
 
First, observer states that issued recommendations under the first category used the 
relationship between polygamy and culture as a foundation to criticise the practice, and 
recommend that it be eradicated. The nature of these statements indicate any deviations from 
the international human rights jurisprudence, which provided protection to women’s rights 
against polygamous marriages, will not be accepted; despite such marriages being embedded 
in the traditional values of the state. It is posited that the essence of this position adopted by 
observer states resonate with the strictest interpretation of universalism. At the heart of this 
position is that the implementation of human rights norms should transcend any cultural 
boundaries and particularities (Sloane 2001). In this regard, it is notable that when statements 
of the very strong form of universalism were issued, the states under review demonstrated a 
very subdued and defensive demure. For instance, the states under review either accepted or 
noted the recommendation and remained silent, or emphasised that existing laws were 
already in place. This ultimately resulted in an arguably unfruitful dialogue, as the states under 
review failed to agree on any commitments on reforms to domestic regulation on polygamy to 
abide by the international position on such marriages. This is particularly disappointing as the 
very foundation and make-up of the UPR process has been purposively designed to invite 
cooperative discussions amongst states on culturally sensitive issues with a vision to improve 
the domestic human rights protection. In addition, this rather sterile outcome of these state 
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reviews provides significant practical force to the prevalent conceptual criticisms of the strict 
presumption of the universality of human rights, which has been the subject of writings for a 
number of renowned scholars. (Short 2011; An-Na’im 1995; Dembour 2001; Renteln 2013).  
 
The second manner in which the relationship between polygamy and culture was recognised 
was in the issuance of N4 responses. Here, some states under review used the relationship 
between culture and polygamy as a foundation to justify the existence of such marriages, and 
to decline to accept the recommendations on the issue. This position, which was adopted by 
the vast majority of states under review that did not accept the recommendations on 
polygamy, affiliates with the strongest form of cultural relativism. At the heart of this belief is 
the position that legal and moral standards, which are determined by cultural values, trump 
any universal claims on a particular issue (Tesón 1985). This belief is reflected in the essence 
of the position posited by Burkina Faso, Chile, Ghana, Libya and Senegal, who all expressly 
challenged the suggested reforms to the regulation of polygamy, and justified their position 
the ground that such marriages were embedded in cultural and religious norms. This implies 
that the legitimization of polygamy by internal cultural norms of the states takes priority over 
any external moral or legal standards that may declare polygamous marriages to be contrary 
to international human rights norms. Despite such an express and obvious challenge to the 
universality of the international human rights jurisprudence on polygamy, it was notable that 
no observer states capitalised on the benefits of an instantaneous dialogue at the UPR process 
to hold the states under review accountable for such a bold rejection of reforms. One of the 
fundamental criticisms of strict cultural relativism is its exaggerated claim of the impossibility 
of cross cultural dialogue, which is used as a basis to provide immunity from criticism to any 
norms and values that emanate from culture (Spaak 1979; Harman and Thomson 1995; Jarvie 
1983). The failing by observer states to hold states that affiliated with the strictest form of 
relativism to account lends support to these very criticisms. This disappointing, particularly as 
the UPR process is characterised by its constructive and cooperative dialogue, which was 
envisaged to create an apt international platform to discuss culturally sensitive and 




So far it can be observed that whenever the relationship between polygamy and culture has 
been recognised during state reviews, the positions adopted by states affiliate either with the 
strongest forms of universalist or relativist positions. This is in sharp contrast to the 
contemporary scholarly debates on the issue, where the conversation on the conceptualisation 
and implementation of rights has moved away from such polarised extremes, towards more 
nuanced alternatives that have focused on reaping the benefits of both positions (Dembour 
2001; Renteln 1985, 2013; An-Na’im 1991; Lenzerini 2014; Merry 2003; Zwart 2012; 
Obermeyer 1995; Falk 1995). Going further, when the polarised extremes are adopted in 
practice on an international discourse on human rights norms, the findings of this investigation 
reveal that the presumed conceptualisation of culture, and the implications that derive from 
this interpretation, gives grounds to suggest that there are more similarities with the two 
positions than is initially apparent.  
 
To begin with, state representatives that have adopted a universalist or relativist approach 
have, either explicitly or implicitly, adopted a traditional conceptualisation of culture (Boas 
2012; Li 2006; Bell 2001). This is because those states that issued category 1 recommendations, 
or N4 responses, have presumed the very belief that has subjected this interpretation of 
culture to wide criticism, which is that norms and values within culture are immune from 
changes and reforms. For example, states that posited a universalist position in under category 
1 recommendations not only suggested the prohibition of polygamous marriages, but the 
references to culture also implied that the cultural values and beliefs, which may condone 
polygamous marriages should also be eliminated. This shows that the observer states issuing 
the recommendations failed to consider if, and how, the cultural norms that condone such 
marriages can be reformed. Similarly, the states that issued N4 responses to defend polygamy, 
from a position that resonated with cultural relativism, failed to recognise the possibility that 
cultural and religious particularities that underpin such marriages may be subject to 
contentions within the proclaimed culture, or even subject to reforms.  
 
The implications of such a polarised debate during state reviews is that the discussions on the 
relationship between culture and polygamy are oversimplified. Drawing upon the analysis of 
Ann-Belinda Pries, she explains that in between the strict opposite positions of the relativist 
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and universalist debate, ‘it is as if larger, more important questions are lurking under the 
surface, but they remained unexplored and somewhat blocked precisely because of the rigid 
‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy inherent in the ‘culture contact’ perspective.’ (Pries 1996; Ulin 
2007). This oversight of larger unexplored issues is evident in the polarised manner in which 
the discussions of polygamy in the UPR process were held. For instance, those that adopted a 
universalist stance to criticise polygamous marriages failed to acknowledge that those that are 
sympathetic to such marriages often hold deeply embedded views that such marriages are 
legitimised on cultural and religious grounds. (Rehman 2007). As such, suggestions to simply 
eliminate such practices that are condoned by culturally held beliefs is not a plausible or a 
helpful recommendation. Going further, others sympathetic to polygamous marriages often 
strongly hold the conviction that polygamous marriages are a function of socio-political 
alliances and a source of prestige, power and influence (Nkomazana 2006). In this way, 
observer states restricted the discussions to employing culture to suggest elimination of such 
marriages, rather even engaging in discourse to address the deeper underlying reasons as to 
why such marriages are undertaken in the first place. Similarly, when states responded by 
justifying the marriages on cultural grounds they overlooked multiple complex issues in 
relation to culture and such marriages. To name a few, states defending such marriages 
overlooked the issue of gender inequalities in the apparent consent obtained for such 
marriages; the concern of women being unfaithful to their religion and being ostracised should 
they object to such marriage structures; (Alexandre 2007; Raday 2003); and the possibility of 
suppression and marginalisation of the voices of women in such marriage structures 
(Nkomazana 2006). 
 
This over simplistic nature of discussions on the relationship between polygamy and culture 
draws emphasis on the absence of one clear dimension of discussions being held in the UPR 
process. Both in the first and second cycle of the debate, the discussions held in the interactive 
dialogue sessions have failed to recognise the merits of cultural support in the conversations 
of implementing universal human rights. In other words, there is a clear absence of discussions 
affiliating with the mediated middle ground between universalism and relativism towards 
achieving culturally legitimate human rights. One aspect of furthering the goal of culturally 
legitimate human rights is for external actors not only to discuss the scope and implementation 
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of rights, but also to encourage those within the culture to engage in an internal discourse to 
help legitimise human rights in the domestic context. (An-Na’im 1994; Lenzerini 2014; Merry 
2003). The unique and innovative character of the interactive dialogue session is the one of 
the most obvious platform for this cross cultural dialogue to be undertaken. Unfortunately, 
there is no evidence of the discussions in either cycle that even vaguely resonated with this 
approach.  
 
There are practical and theoretical implications in the states’ failing to engage in discussions 
that recognises the benefits of achieving culturally legitimate human rights norms to protect 
women’s rights in polygamous marriages.  In terms of the practical implications, once the 
outcome of the UPR is adopted in the plenary session, the discussions and the 
recommendations held on a particular issue can be used as advocacy tools by civil society and 
other stakeholder for policy dialogue and social change. The political momentum that is 
generated at the UPR process, through the discussions and recommendations, can initiate or 
facilitate avenues for participation by a range of stakeholders in the domestic context. The 
statements made by representatives in the interactive dialogue session can be used in the 
national coordination, planning and monitoring for the promotion and protection of human 
rights issues in the domestic context. In this way, the nature of discussions held at the UPR 
process becomes critical in the development of the direction and tone of any social, cultural 
and policy reforms on the ground.  
 
In light of this, in the context of the discussions held on polygamy, the oversimplified nature of 
debates, and the lack of a culturally legitimate angle to the discussions is a cause for concern. 
This is because either defending polygamous marriages on cultural grounds or to suggest to 
eliminate polygamous marriages regardless of its cultural significance fails to take into account 
the dynamic and flexible nature of culture, and that the norms of culture may be subject to 
reforms. At no point during the first or second cycle were states encouraged engage in an 
internal dialogue, within the cultural context, to achieve cultural support for the international 
human rights law position on polygamy. In this way, those states that recognised the 
relationship between polygamy and culture failed initiate discussions for incremental reforms 
on the beliefs of the practice in the local context. This oversight is most profound in those cases 
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where states used culture to defence polygamous marriages. Representatives could have 
encouraged an internal discourse on the issue, which in turn could have been used by the 
relevant national stake holders to drive policy and cultural changes on the issue on the ground. 
This would have been particularly significant and useful in those instances where states have 
used cultural norms as a foundation to defend such practices. This would have provided the 
required tool for national stakeholders to then utilise the tone of this discussion to achieve 
cultural legitimacy of rights in relation to polygamy to initiate reforms through national, social 
and cultural dialogue on the issue. However, as it currently stands, the stakeholders that may 
seek to undertake reforms in the domestic policy have little momentum that they can use from 
the UPR process to facilitate any conversation of reforms for rejections provided on the 
recommendations based on cultural justifications on the practice.  
 
This leads to the theoretical implications for the lack of a culturally legitimate approach being 
recognised on the conversation on the UPR process. Whilst in scholarly writings the polarised 
debate between universalism and relativism is one that is largely reserved in the history, in the 
practice, conversations in relation to polygamy gives reason to suggest that it continues to exist 
in some instances of discussions in relation to international human rights law. As a result, the 
problematic implications of such a polarised discussions are applicable in the modern day 
discourse on human rights on the international forum in relation to polygamy.  
1.7. Conclusion 
At the end of two complete cycles, all 193 member states of the UN have been reviewed on 
their human rights obligations, twice. This complete participation by the states meets one of 
its fundamental aims of universal applicability of the process. It is the first mechanism at the 
United Nations, where all member states have been reviewed in this egalitarian manner. The 
second claim of universality embedded in the UPR process was the focus of this investigation. 
The aim was to assess whether claim of promoting and protecting the universality of the 
human rights been met, or challenged, during state reviews in the UPR process? The findings 
of this investigation gives reason to doubt whether this second claim of universality of the UPR 
process stands to equal success to its universal applicability.  
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To begin with, the findings of this investigation reveal that when the issue of polygamy was 
raised, all observer states undertaking state reviews, either explicitly or implicitly, adopted 
positions that reaffirmed United Nations stance that polygamous marriages violated women’s 
rights, and therefore should be abolished. In fact, some observer states adopted a stricter form 
of universalism as they indicated that such marriages should be eliminated, despite being 
justified on values and beliefs that were based on culture. However, this adherence to the 
international standards on women’s rights in polygamous marriages was not reflected 
unanimously by the states under review when issued with recommendations on polygamy. In 
fact, there was evidence to suggest that some states under review adopted positions that 
affiliated with cultural relativism as a reason to decline to accept reforms on polygamy. Thus, 
in answering the central question of this investigation, the findings of this investigation reveal 
that the central aim to promote and protect the universality of all human rights norms is not 
consistently adhered to in relation to all human rights issues. In fact, on controversial issues 
such as polygamy, states used the platform was used to challenge the claimed universality of 
international human rights norms on polygamous marriages. This gives reason to question 
whether the central claim of universality of the UPR process is successfully achieved.  
 
There are two main conclusions that can be drawn based on the findings and discussions of 
this investigation. To begin with, the peer review nature of the review process means that 
there will be a unique composition of state participants that will undertake the review for each 
member state. This in turn means that the nature of discussions during the interactive dialogue 
stage, that form the focus of all state reviews, will change and adapt depending on the states 
participating in the reviews and, more importantly, the human rights issue being discussed. 
This means that the extent to which the embedded universalist claims of promoting all human 
rights norm is met will vary not only between state reviews, but also, within the lines of 
dialogue in relation to the specific human rights issue itself. Thus, depending on the human 
rights issue at stake, an analysis of discussions held on polygamy shows that where the issue is 
controversial in nature, and in particular, has a relationship with culture, the extent of the 
challenge from a degree of cultural relativism will similarly vary depending on the state being 
reviewed and the human rights issue at stake. Consequently, the findings of this project give 
reason to question the overarching universalist aims and principles on the basis that the nature 
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of each state review is unique in nature as it will be formed depending on the participants of 
the state review and the human rights issues discussed. 
 
The second conclusion of this investigation emanates from the challenge of cultural relativism 
adopted some states in the discussions held on polygamy in the first cycle of reviews. The 
findings of this investigation showed that whilst the polarised debated between universalism 
and relativism was a distant past in the scholarly debates, this polarisation shows shadows of 
materialising in practice on dialogues in relation to polygamy in the two cycles of review. The 
analysis showed how such a polarised debated on polygamy and culture resulted some 
discussions held on polygamy were not only oversimplified, but they failed to raise and address 
some of the fundamental issues in relation to women’s rights and concerns within the 
polygamous marriage structure. Leading from the express challenge from a cultural relativist 
position on the platform of the UPR process, what was also striking to note was that the states 
themselves were not held accountable for their challenge to the universality of international 
women’s rights. This silence by the observer states in response to an implicit or explicit 
challenge to the universality of human rights norms from a cultural relativist perspective is 
cause for concern. This is because if a challenge from a strict cultural relativist position is 
expressed in a sustained manner in the second cycle and beyond, and the observer states 
remain silent and refrain from holding the state to account, then this could result in having 
wider ramifications to the universality of women’s rights protection. This is primarily because 
an unchecked challenge to the universality of women’s rights on an international platform such 
as the UPR process, may in fact undermine the universality of the particular women’s rights 
obligations when raised on different platforms, whether that be on UN treaty bodies, 
advocated by NGOs or in the national jurisprudence. It has been argued in the literature that 
the outcomes of the UPR process can potentially be significant enough to be considered as 
contributing to the international human rights law itself. However, if such gravity and 
importance is given to those outcomes where states show evidence of consensus on 
international human rights protection, then similar grave concern should be raised when states 




As we enter in to the third cycle of review, the findings of this investigation indicate that it 
seems essential to undertake further exploration of the UPR process with a particular focus on 
the universalist claim of the review process. If nothing else, this is particularly necessary as a 
sustained and unchecked challenge to the universality of international human rights norms on 
an international platform like the UPR process could potentially have wider ramifications for 
the international human rights infrastructure itself. Such research seems particularly apt as the 
third cycle of review of this innovative review process has recently commenced. 
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